Joe McConnell
The author is Managing Director for Europe at Eurasia Group
The European Commission’s “list of demands” that Sir Keir Starmer faces to improve bilateral relations between the UK and the European Union shows how much the bloc needs to rethink its approach to Britain and Brexit.
The Labour government has already done this. The European Political Community meeting at Blenheim Palace in July provided the perfect platform for Starmer to advance phase 1 of his EU “reset,” restoring trust aVsceker the adversarial relationship with the Tory government. Phase 2 involves identifying policy areas of common interest, and phase 3 is defining them.
Senior Labour officials hope that a deal on a security pact, given the UK’s defence and intelligence clout, would be a major opening offer that would allow the EU to respond by reducing trade barriers.
In public, the EU welcomes Starmer’s constructive approach. There is a willingness to cooperate on security and defence. But in private, many senior EU officials remain stuck in 2016, pointing to the UK’s third-country status and the EU’s resistance to cherry-picking and mixing security and trade. This suggests a reluctance to seize the opportunities of a Starmer-led Britain.
Today’s context is different. The EU’s position in 2016 was driven by fears that a UK-friendly deal outside the bloc would set a precedent. Thanks to the political chaos and economic challenges of Brexit, that risk no longer exists; European populists of all stripes no longer advocate leaving.
This should create more political space for creative thinking. As should Labour’s approach to the EU. While Starmer has ruled out rejoining the customs union or the single market, his party has little problem with dynamic alignment with EU standards, a level playing field, or the role of the European Court of Justice in scrutinising new agreements.
Things Labour is keen to consider include a visa scheme for EU citizens aged 18 to 30, a top priority for Brussels. The EU will likely seek an early review of fishing quotas to ensure continued access to British waters, which, while politically fraught, will be less of a symbolic issue for Labour than it was for the Conservatives.
These concessions should address the deep-seated reservations of France, one of the hardest member states, by demonstrating that a Labour government is willing to give up some sovereignty to move closer to the EU.
While Starmer will not accept all elements of the single market, such as free movement of workers, he will accept some. The EU must respond in kind. Accepting more obligations should confer more rights. While senior EU officials acknowledge this, they do not yet have a firm view on what additional market access a Starmer offer should secure.
The geopolitical context also highlights the need for greater European ambition. A return of Donald Trump to the White House could fundamentally weaken the US commitment to NATO and European security. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has seen the return of a full-scale war to the continent. This has stimulated a willingness to revive enlargement as a foreign policy instrument, and to implement it more innovatively. Ukraine is now being progressively integrated into parts of the single market, rather than being forced to swallow the Community Acquis — the whole of common law — demonstrating that the EU can prioritise politics and think creatively when it wants to.
Greater cooperation on security and defence between the EU and the UK, including on defence industrial policy, makes perfect sense. But improving trade relations is also crucial. The big fear in senior Labour circles is that the EU will pocket a defence deal to benefit from the UK’s military might, without giving much in return. But ultimately, both sides will only be safe if their economies grow as much as possible and generate the resources that will allow them to remain secure.
Poland, the Baltic and Nordic states, which see the military crisis on Europe’s eastern border as an existential threat to liberal democracy, must help support this broader cause.
No one in Europe is in favor of a formal renegotiation: the idea that revising the Trade and Cooperation Agreement in 2026 is the best way to address the fundamental economic relationship is wrong. This reset must be political, not technocratic or legalistic.
Starmer and Commission President Ursula von der Leyen should prepare an ambitious political declaration for their first summit in the coming weeks. It should prioritise foreign and security policy. But Brussels should not fear an upgrade of the key trade and economic relationship. As on security, this would be mutually beneficial. The zero-sum game of UK-EU relations since the 2016 referendum is finally over; the EU must recognise that closer cooperation is a win-win for both sides.
